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Abstract 
While heated discussions have been directed towards various innovative procurement systems 
such as PPP, PFI, and BOT that carry the great expectation to help materialise the projects 
and deliver value to the society, a procurement system named agent-construction system (ACS 
or in Chinese Dai Jian Zhi) is being prevailing in China’s public procurement. This research 
aims to examine ACS by relating them to China’s particular Political, Economics, Social, 
Technological, Environmental, and Legal (PESTEL) background. It is found that the ACS is 
promising in procuring public projects owing to two merits: (a) clearly defined right 
and responsibilities; and (b) appropriate allocation of resources and risks amongst parties 
involved. The research is particularly useful when governments worldwide are searching for 
innovative procurement approaches to help deliver public projects and services. It also sheds 
light on how to devise an innovative procurement system. A word of caution, nevertheless, is 
that readers should not follow this “good practice” slavishly. One ought to truly understand 
the essence of procurement innovation and devise suitable innovative procurement systems in 
a given PESTEL setting. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of procuring public construction projects, no matter whether it is in socialist or 
capitalist countries, or whether it is in developing or developed worlds, there have been 
widespread problems discovered. Particularly in China, though its construction industry has 
made significant development owing to its strong economic growth and unprecedented 
urbanization plan, several problems have been frequently mentioned, such as cost overrun, late 
delivery, delay of payment, low efficiency, overstaffed organizations and/or corruption (Yan, 
Yan, & Yin, 2009; Yin & Yan, 2006; Zhang, 2008). To address these problems, governments 
worldwide are searching for innovative procurement approaches that can help procure projects 
in a more efficient way and thus truly deliver values to the society. The often-discussed 
innovative procurement methods may include, inter alia, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) first 
introduced in Turkey, Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) initially put forward by UK 
government, and Private-Public-Partnership (PPP) that has been ubiquitously discussed around 
the world.  
 
It is generally observed that there are two trends in these innovative procurement approaches. 
Firstly, public procurement is shifting from traditional state-led approaches to partnering 
between public and private sectors, expecting that the private sector can be more active in 
improving efficiency and delivering value (Egan, 1998, Winch, 2000). Secondly, integrated 
approaches were adopted to reduce the problems of fragmentation and discontinuity by which 
the construction sector has long been plagued (Anderson et al., 2000). Together with the trends 
is the systems view to construction procurement which emphasizes a procurement system 
including elements such as contract strategy, culture (e.g. trust and institutions), and finance, 
should deserve more attention of the construction and project management fraternity 
(Rowlinson, 1999).  
 
With the success of the procurement systems in some mega projects, they have been introduced 
to other economies for procuring new projects. However, “one size does not fit all”; a 
procurement system growing from a certain Political, Economics, Social, Technological, 
Environmental, and Legal (PESTEL) background may not be of full applicability to other 
economies with different PESTEL settings. Adopting them slavishly may cause loss or even 
failure of a project. The big issue is thus to devise innovative procurement systems that are 
suitable for a given PESTEL setting and should truly deliver value to the society. On the other 
hand, notably in China, an Agent-Construction System (ACS or in Chinese Dai Jian Zhi) is 
widely adopted in the procurement of public projects, for example, the Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Games projects. It is intriguing to examine why the ACS became the most widespread 
procurement approach and what are the implications to procurement innovation that can help 
procure projects in a more efficient way.  
 
The aim of this research is to shed light on procurement innovation by skeptically examining 
the ACS and relating it to China’s particular PESTEL background. The rest of this paper is 
structured into three sections. Firstly, research design and methods are described – this is 
comprised of extensive literature review and interviews with practitioners. Secondly, 
 discussions are conducted to deepen the understanding of the ACS in terms of its history, 
strengths and weaknesses. Of particular importance is to project the procurement systems into 
China’s PESTEL background. Research findings are presented in this section. Finally, key 
conclusions are drawn together.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The principle underlying in this research is that a procurement system should be examined 
skeptically in terms of its suitability to a certain PESTEL setting. This principle is an 
extension of the systems view to construction procurement contributed by Rowlinson (1999). 
This investigation thus adopts PESTEL as an analytic framework. PESTEL analysis, standing 
for Political, Economics, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal, is a framework of 
macro-environmental factors used in the environmental scanning component of strategic 
management. It also gives an overview of the different macro environmental factors that a 
procurement system has to take into consideration. 
 
Bearing in mind the PESTEL framework, the authors investigate various sources by using a 
literature survey in order to truly understand the ACS in China. There are three prevailing 
books (Zhang, 2008; Yin and Yan, 2006; Hou, 2006) about the ACS. The understanding of 
the ACS was enhanced by a body of articles published on different journals but being 
organized under a Project Manager Union (2010) website. Archived papers, presentations and 
in particular keynote speeches by governmental officers in the First National Summit on 
“Agent-Construction System: theories and practices” provide very useful literature for this 
study. The search of the literature was further enhanced by using a CNKI database for 
research papers. All the literature on the ACS is in Chinese. This presents a possibility that 
information will be lost in the translation but it also provides a chance for cross referencing 
by perusing them in two languages. The literature survey has projected the procurement 
system into China’s PESTEL background, which is changing rapidly, though in various 
speed. 
 
The second stage of this research adopts interview as the main method for investigating the 
ACS in China. Interviews allow for an in-depth interpretation of the comparisons. Three 
interviews have been conducted. Somehow, these took place over a long period with the first 
one being conducted in December of 2009 with the vice president of an international 
construction company and the last one in December of 2010 with a government officer in 
charge of audit of government-invested projects including those adopted the ACS. Each 
interview lasted 40–60 minutes and the transcriptions are used to cross validate the 
understanding from the previous literature survey. The data from the literature survey and 
interviews is to be analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 ANALYSES, DISCUSSIONS, AND FINDINGS 
 
General PESTEL Background for public project procurement in China 
In order to effectively understand the Agent-Construction System (ACS), it is necessary to 
relate the system with China’s PESTEL background. China is known as a socialist country 
adopting a Marxism-Leninism ideology. Based on this ideology, a centrally planned economy 
system has been adopted and there was no private sector. Since 1978 when the country 
adopted an “open-door” policy, the economy has been reformed from the traditional planned 
economy to a market economy. Lu (2009) used the spectrum as shown in Fig. 1 to illustrate 
the transition of the economy systems. Yang (2004) also effectively summarize that all the 
significant affairs taken place in China since 1978 can be understood by putting them into 
two spectrums similar to Fig. 1, one for political reform and the other for economy. It can be 
seen from the spectrum that gradually economic activities and factors of production are 
configured by the market as “the invisible hand” instead of a central plan. The zigzag of the 
curve represents its struggling with two briefs of “plan (state planning)” and “market 
(incentive-based competition)”, which were traditional labeled as “socialism” and 
“capitalism” respectively. Whilst Western economists argue that these two are not natural 
partners, it is generally accepted in China that “government planning and market regulating 
are two integral parts of the socialist market economic system”. It should allow the market to 
allocate factors of production and to increase efficiency while the central planning is 
indispensable in ensuring healthy development of the whole economy. Although the market 
economy is now dominant, the whole economy system still has a strong “planning” culture. 
For example, the economic goals have been achieved through its “Five-Year Plans”, which 
are a series of economic development initiatives shaped by the Central Committee and 
National Congresses to map strategies for economic development, set growth targets, and 
launch reforms. Currently, it is in the 12th “Five-Year Plans” (2011-2015). As a result of the 
economy reform, China’s GDP grows at an average rate of about 10%, reaching a GDP of 
$4.99 trillion in nominal term in 2009, becoming the world's second largest economy after 
the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of economic reform in China 
 
Intertwined with the political and economic development is its unprecedented urbanization in 
China. Urbanization has been the major drivers of China’s GDP growth over the past decades 
and it will become even more so over the next 20 years. According to the UN World 
Urbanization Prospects (UN, 2009), the level of urbanization in China is 46.1, with a 
population of 620million living in urban areas, while this level will be 73.2 in 2050 and the 
urban population will be 1 billion. A McKinsey report (2009) forecasted that 1 billion people 
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 will live in China’s cities even early in 2030, and 5 billion m2 of road will be paved, 170 
mass-transit systems could be built, and 40 billion m2 of floor space will be built in 5 million 
buildings by 2025. These resonate with China’s fixed-asset investment on property, roads, 
and other infrastructures to sustain the economic growth as well as the urbanization ambition. 
For example, in 2009, the total fixed-asset investment was 22,486 billion Yuan (NBS, 2010). 
Although the government investment system is in transition, for example, in 2004, a 
regulation named Decision on Reforming the Government Investment System was 
promulgated by the Chinese State Council, the government is still dominant in both the 
public spending and the procurement of government-invested facilities driven by the 
urbanization. Normally, there are two types of government-invested projects: (i) 
non-profit-making, for example, urban roads, schools, hospitals, libraries, museums, 
government offices(These are called institutional buildings in Hong Kong), and (ii) 
profit-making utilities, i.e. water, gas, sewage facilities, tolling roads, bridges and tunnels, 
etc.  
 
In the face of the ambitious urbanization plan, Chinese government is keen to introduce 
innovative procurement systems that can help materialize the huge demand of public projects. 
Various writers (e.g. Liu, 2001; Zhang, 2007) summarized a genealogy of the typical 
government public procurement systems as follows: 
(a) Self-build model, in which the end users (i.e. a university, or a hospital), more precisely, 
their long-standing project organizations, are in charge of the construction projects. They 
define project scopes, apply for budget from the government, and procure the project by 
themselves;  
(b) Government construction commanding units model, in which a temporary governmental 
unit was set up to command the budgeting and construction of a given project, e.g. a road 
committed by a local government. The project will be transferred to the end users after 
completion.  
(c) State-owned construction enterprises model, in which the State-owned enterprises are in 
charge of the construction of a project. For example, for Ministry of Railway (MOR), 
Ministry of Transportation (MOT), Ministry of Construction (MOC), they had their own 
construction bureaus which later were transformed to state-owned construction enterprises in 
charge of specific types of projects (i.e. railway, road infrastructure, and residential 
buildings).  
 
Later, the market-oriented economy reform introduced competition. The competitive bidding 
and tendering has changed the system of construction project financing from traditionally 
government-free allocations to loans from commercial banks, and changed the project 
procurement system from traditional government assignments to competition through the 
tendering process as occurs in international practice (Shen and Song, 1998). But for the 
public projects, the government is still dominant in financing and procurement, mainly 
through the National Planning Commission, although it was renamed to the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Public clients are remaining as various 
state-owned organizations; the construction commanding units model is still seen every now 
and then (e.g. Shanghai Expo 2010) while for some profit-making public projects, a Legal 
 Person system (e.g. Water Affairs Group Limited; Road and Bridge Corporations) is adopted 
as a legal entity to be responsible for the profit and loss of the projects. The state-owned 
construction firms were pushed into a competitive market and became real companies that are 
responsible for their own gains and loss. The above procurement systems, with a label of the 
planned economy, have been changed with the transition of the whole economy system. More 
diversified procurement systems appeared, for example: 
(d) Legal person model, in which a project company will be set up as a legal entity, usually a 
qualified and authorized organization, to take charge of the procurement and also operation of 
the construction project. 
(e) Governmental investment and development companies. This model is not significantly 
different from the Model (d) above but this one should be responsible for the financing of a 
project thus return of investment is of high concern. 
(f) Government procurement center model, in which a government procurement center is 
established to be in charge of procuring a project which will be transferred to the end-users 
after its completion. 
 
With a closer investigation, it can be summarized that the above models have actually 
struggled to streamline the relationships between government (as both a market regulator and 
a client), project contractors (state-owned or private enterprises), and end-users (often the 
public sector). Typical relationships between the parties underlying in different procurement 
systems can be seen in Fig. 2. The relationships could be underlying in any government 
investment project in any economy but this is more important as an issue in China which 
adopted a socialist economy. It is believed that the unclear relationships are the main causal 
factor for problems in public procurement. For example, budget overrun is widespread as a 
result of enlarging project scope by end users; quality is poor as no professional construction 
management is in place; rent-seeking in these relationships leads to misconduct and 
corruptions. The Agent Construction System (ACS) and the exotic systems such as PPP, PFI, 
and BOT, etc were introduced under this particular PESTEL background. 
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Figure 2: The relationships of government, contractors, and end-users in various public 
procurement systems 
 
Agent-Construction System (ACS or Dai Jian Zhi) 
It is generally agreed that the ACS was firstly trialed in Xiamen in 1993 and formally 
introduced in 2004 when the Chinese State Council issued a regulation named Decision on 
Reforming the Government Investment System. The term firstly appeared in the Decision in 
which it was stated that for procuring government-invested non-profit-making projects, 
professional construction management units are selected through competitive bidding and 
tendering to conduct the construction projects, to control project cost, quality, and time, and 
to turn over the projects to the future users or operators after they are successfully constructed. 
Similarly, the relationships in an ACS is illustrated in Fig. 3.  
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Figure 3: The relationships of government, construction agents, contractors, and end-users 
in the Agent-Construction System 
 
By comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 2, a major difference observed is that the construction 
management units (CMUs) are selected as an agent of the government investment body, 
through competitive bidding and tendering, to conduct a certain or all stages of construction 
projects, i.e. feasibility study, design, contracting, construction and handover after completion, 
meanwhile to strictly control project cost, quality and time. The ACS, therefore, is considered 
by many researchers as the construction management system originated in the U.S. This view 
places an emphasis on that the CMUs, with more professional knowledge than the 
government investment body or end-users, can help overcome the problems in procuring 
public projects. There is another view considering that the ACS can overcome the problems 
by streamlining the relationships amongst the parties. After the project was completed, it will 
be transferred to end-users, who applies for a project from the very beginning, while has no 
intervention during the execution of the project. All the details of rights and obligations are 
required to be clearly specified in an agent-construction contract, and so are the risk sharing 
mechanism and dispute solving approaches. Through this way, it is hoped that budget overrun 
can be reduced as end-users cannot enlarge project scope any more, and quality can be 
improved by introducing the CMUs. The latter view emphasizes a clear definition of rights 
and obligations of various parties that are involved in a public projects. Both views are 
correct while more analyses are needed to clarify the many ambiguities in the ACS. 
 
The Decision only addresses a general principle (Yan et al., 2009) while applicable 
procurement systems are subject to detailed elaborations by individual provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities. For example, the government investment body could 
be Provincial Development and Reform Commissions (PDRC) themselves (e.g. in Beijing), 
or their authorized institutions (i.e. in Shanghai Chengtou Corporation as a professional 
industrial investment group company engaged in the construction and operation of the city’s 
 infrastructure facilities), or ender users (i.e. the model in Chongqing). According to Zhang 
(2008), the last mode should not be regarded as the ACS. In addition, the professional CMUs 
could be professional project management companies which are complete legal entities, or 
government specially-set institutions which are extended government executive arms (e.g. 
Bureau of Public Works in Shenzhen). Actually, the latter form is not significantly different 
from the model (f) governmental procurement center as illustrated in Fig. 2. With different 
combinations of government investment bodies and CMUs, a wide variety of procurement 
systems which are generated and all claimed to be ACS. Yin (2008) summarized there are 
three models of ACS in China: Beijing Model with Beijing DRC as the investor and 
professional CMUs as the construction agent, Shanghai Model with project investment 
corporation and professional CMUs, and Shenzhen Model with government as the investor 
and Works Bureau as the agent. 
 
During the course, there emerge various forms of ACS that respectively embody some 
features and strengths/weakness of emerging procurement modes such as BOT, PFI, EPC, or 
BT, which are more familiar to the construction and project management fraternity. Some 
state-owned companies, with their relatively strong financing, architecture, engineering, and 
construction capabilities, acted as the government’s agent in procuring projects. Instead of 
operating for a certain years as BOT does, the projects will be completely purchased back by 
the government after 2 to 5 years. This model is reported as successful to create a win-win 
situation by complementing with each other using each party’s strengths. It also reduces each 
party’s weaknesses while introducing a risk sharing mechanism that is critical to the success 
of public construction projects. 
 
Although there is no consensus on what the ACS is, it has become a widespread procurement 
system in China. According to Yan et al. (2009), by the end of 2008, 45 out of totally 47 
regions including provinces, municipalities and special provincial-level cities in the mainland 
China have issued their guidelines on how to conduct the ACS in line with the Decision. In 
many regions, the ACS has been made as a mandatory system while in some others the 
system is promulgated with greater flexibility when procuring government-invested 
non-profit-making public projects. According to Yin (2008), by the end of 2005, there were 
153 completed, 164 ongoing, and 85 planned projects adopting the ACS. The Beijing 2008 
Olympic Games projects also adopted this procurement system. The discussions of the pros 
and cons of the system have been prolific. All these provide a good standing point to compare 
the ACS and PPP in China. 
 
The ACS and Procurement Innovation 
Hughes et al. (2006) suggest that to define procurement, the following six aspects of 
procurement must be defined at the same time: 
1) ownership, initiation and funding, e.g. owner-financed, public sector-financed, 
developer financed, PFI; 
2) selection method, e.g. negotiation, partnering, frameworks, selective competition, 
open competition; 
 3) price basis, e.g. work and materials as defined by bills of quantity, whole building, a 
fully-maintained facility, performance; 
4) responsibility for design, e.g. architect, engineer, contractor, in-house design teams; 
5) responsibility for management, e.g. client, lead designer, principal contractor, JV; and 
6) amount of sub-contracting, e.g. 0-100%. 
Innovation could be taken place in one or more aspects as listed above. Furthermore, the 
combination of these aspects provides a wide range of innovative procurement options. Their 
work provides a framework for analyzing the ACS as a procurement innovation here. 
 
Ownership, initiation and funding: The adoption of ACS has not changed the fact that the 
public sector is still dominant in initiating, funding, and owning non-profit-making public 
projects. Unlike some governments which are suffering from lack of fund, Chinese 
government is relatively rich due to closely monitored fiscal policy and high saving rate of 
Chinese people. This mainly explains why PPP, PFI, BOT are not really popular in China. 
This ACS actually tries to streamline the relationships between investors, owners, 
professional management units, and contractors so as to overcome the problem of budget 
overrun.  
 
Selection method: The ACS clearly stated that competitive bidding and tendering will be 
adopted in the selection of construction agents. However, this has not been fully implemented 
in some forms of ACS, for example, the Shenzhen model, similar to many other things, which 
copied from Hong Kong. Further studies to investigate the effectiveness of a similar system 
in two different PESTEL settings are envisaged. 
 
Responsibilities for design and management: The ACS is much superior to other procurement 
systems for shifting the responsibilities for design and management to professional CMUs. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the part of responsibilities was traditionally assumed by government or 
its executive arms, which are not necessarily professional in design and management of 
public projects. Instead of managing individual projects, government was liberated by the 
system and can focus on regulating efficient market rules. It is through professional design 
and management that the problems of budget overrun, poor quality, and delayed delivery are 
expected to be reduced. 
 
Price basis and sub-contracting: In the ACS, the issues were left to the professional CMUs 
with several principles. For providing the professional services, the construction agent will 
receive a service fee plus some incentive schemes.  
 
Risk sharing mechanism: While has not been mentioned in Hughes et al.’s work, risk and 
reward allocation is critical for the success of an innovative procurement system. The ACS, 
particularly for the form similar to BT, creates a win-win situation by reasonably considering 
the risks bored by each party. It is noteworthy that instead of 30 years as PFI promises, 2-5 
years is a reasonable period that the risk associated with the PESTEL background, changing 
in a high speed, can be handled by both the governments and the construction agents. 
 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the face of widespread problems in public project procurement such as cost overrun, low 
quality and delayed delivery, governments worldwide are searching for innovative 
procurement systems that can help procure projects in a more efficient way and thus truly 
deliver values to the society. The ACS is reported as successful in China’s particular Political, 
Economics, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal (PESTEL) background, 
although its many weaknesses are yet to be eliminated. The innovations of the ACS are lying 
in two aspects: (a) clearly defined right and responsibilities; and (b) appropriate allocation of 
resources and risks amongst parties involved. 
 
The ACS reported herein can be treated as a “good practice” in project procurement that may 
provide valuable reference to readers. A word of caution, nevertheless, is that readers should 
not follow this “good practice” slavishly. The main proposition of this paper is that one ought 
to truly understand the essence of procurement innovation and devise suitable innovative 
procurement systems in a given PESTEL setting. Further research is suggested to investigate 
a national guideline on the ACS, the service fee for the construction agents. But if aiming to 
provide more references to other economies in procuring public projects, research may be 
directed to devise a more thoughtful risk sharing mechanism that takes into consideration 
each party’s strengths, weaknesses, rights, responsibilities, and rewards respectively.  
 
Nevertheless, a word of caution is that readers should not follow one specific “good practice” 
slavishly. One ought to truly understand the essence of procurement innovation and devise 
suitable innovative procurement systems in a given PESTEL setting. 
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